The Nuclear Predicament

For four decades the world has been  learning to live with nuclear energy. The learning
process has been exciting, frustrating, and sometimes frightening; it is far from over.
Indeed it may be just beginning. We have learned a great deal about how to release
nuclear energy; how to control it, and how to make use of it. We have even learned to
take it for granted. But we have not yet learned to live with it. Nuclear energy, in all its
aspects is already shaping the world. The future of our globe will depend to a startling
extent on what we know about nuclear energy, and what we do about it. The crucial
decisions will not wait another four decades.
Concentrated high-quality energy has become a staple commodity in our industrial
society. The most concentrated energy available is nuclear energy, made accessible by
nuclear reactors. The energy contained in 1 kilogram of uranium, if it were all to be
released in a nuclear reactor, would be equivalent to that produced by burning some 3000
tonnes-of coal. It is not, of course, quite that simple; the possibly apocryphal British
workman who filched some uranium reactor fuel and tried to burn it in his grate was
disappointed. But there is no doubt that the world's reserves of uranium represent a
staggering store of energy. If suitable reactors and other facilities are provided, it
becomes possible to exploit uranium, which would otherwise be virtually useless. The
same is true of the even more plentiful metal thorium.
These constructive possibilities were identified very early in the development of nuclear
energy, even as plans were taking shape to release nuclear energy explosively. The
awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons dominated the scene for the first
post-war decade. But by the mid 1950s scientists and engineers were well on their way to
harnessing this power for peaceful purposes. The prospects looked brighter and brighter.
There had, to be sure, been a surge of euphoric predictions in the aftermath of the two
nuclear explosions over Japan which ended the Second World War. So-called 'atomic
power' would run a car on an engine the size of a fist; we would soon live in houses
heated by uranium; 'atom-powered' aircraft would be able to remain aloft indefinitely;
'atom-powered' rockets would enable us to cross the ocean in three minutes - and so on.
But the people who really understood the implications of nuclear energy were much more
realistic. They chose applications whose development seemed fairly straightforward; and
their efforts bore fruit.
A nuclear reactor releases nuclear energy in the form of heat; the heat is used to generate
steam, and the steam to generate electricity  - with conventional electrical equipment.
Since the mid 1950s nuclear generation of electricity has become a full-fledged
technology. From the outset it seemed that the nuclear approach to electricity generation
would have certain advantages and disadvantages, in comparison with conventional
generating stations which raise steam by burning coal, oil or gas. Fossil-fuelled power
stations are less expensive to build than comparable nuclear power stations. On the other
hand, it was expected that the running cost of a nuclear power station would be
considerably less than that of running a fossil-fuelled station. Some early publicity went 10
so far as to declare that nuclear electricity would be too cheap to meter. But as usual
those on the inside made no such claim. Instead they calculated the total cost of a unit of
electricity generated by a fossil-fuelled or by a nuclear station, taking into account both
capital and running costs. Estimates differed slightly, but there was every likelihood that
a unit of nuclear electricity would cost only about one-fifth as much as a unit of fossil
fuel electricity. On this basis nuclear power stations looked an excellent investment.
In the ensuing years, the bases for these economic calculations varied. For a time the cost
of oil remained low, while that of coal increased; some nuclear costs also increased, and
the balance remained uncertain. By the late 1960s mounting public concern for the
environment was drawing attention to the problems arising from large -scale use of fossil
fuel: health hazards from underground coal-mining, ecological damage from surface
mining, marine pollution from transport of oil, and air pollution from the burning of  coal
and oil. By contrast nuclear power stations seemed environmentally inoffensive.
In the early 1970s the upward surge of oil prices, and increasingly uneasy labour relations
in the coal-fields, added to the comparative economic attractions of nuclear power. The
gradual and tentative industrial commitment to nuclear power for a time accelerated
dramatically; so did the nuclear component of total electricity output.
Governments wanted to lessen their dependence on the petroleum exporting countries;
electricity supply systems wanted to lessen their dependence on coal, especially because
of their vulnerability to recalcitrant unions. Nuclear electricity generation seemed the
obvious alternative. In the longer term, it was argued, coal and oil would become
irreplaceable raw materials for the chemical industry, and should be reserved for these
uses, while nuclear energy was used for electricity. Electricity, it was further argued, is a
premium form of energy, versatile, high-grade and clean at the point of use. It ought
accordingly to make up an ever-larger proportion of the total energy used. Since nuclear
sources could most readily be used to provide electricity, it all seemed to fit together very
neatly. World energy use would continue to rise rapidly; so would energy use per person,
as more and more people shared in the benefits of modern technology. One authoritative
view foresaw a world in which world-wide energy consumption per person would be
twice that of present-day Americans  - this energy would be provided by some 4000
clusters of nuclear power stations, each cluster containing enough reactors to produce
five times the output of today's largest power station. For such a high energy future the
role of nuclear energy would be crucial. Only by the most vigorous possible growth of
nuclear capability could humanity's energy requirements be met.
Such an argument was in many ways persuasive. It was not, however, unanswerable, and
while some voices were calling for more and larger reactors as fast as possible, other
voices were asking other questions, some of which still remain difficult to answer.
The earliest questioning derived from lingering public fear and distrust of nuclear energy,
because of its first appearance as the most devastating weapon ever used. Gradually,
certain specific issues crystallized out of the general unease. The world has somehow got
used  - albeit with deep unease and recurrent protest  - to the overwhelming destructive 11
power stored in the nuclear arsenals of the USA, the Soviet Union, the U K, France and
China; few would hesitate to identify these arsenals as the most terrible threat to the
future of life on earth. But apart from these explicit military aspects of nuclear energy,
several other aspects also give rise to concern. We sha ll examine these in some detail in
the coming chapters. It must here suffice to mention them briefly, as issues which will
recur repeatedly in later discussion.
Nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities produce and contain enormous quantities of
material which is 'radioactive'. Some radioactive materials are very dangerous to living
things, and may remain so for unimaginably long times. These materials must on no
account be allowed to escape in quantity from nuclear facilities. Such facilities release
small amounts of radioactivity to their surroundings during normal operations. One area
of bitter controversy concerns the standards and controls applied to these releases. Some
critics with impressive credentials consider present standards far too lax, especially if
there is to be a continuing increase in the number and size of nuclear installations.
Another major concern is operating safety, not only of the various designs of reactor
themselves but also of their support facilities, including transport systems. It has become
unpleasantly clear that such safety must take into account the possibility not only of
accidents but also of sabotage, and even military attack. A protracted, expert
disagreement about safety has plagued the most popular design of reactor, and continues
unresolved. Other designs have not thus far been subjected to such intense independent
scrutiny.
One category of radioactive material arising from nuclear activities requires particular
attention. This is the 'high-level' waste from used reactor fuel. High-level waste contains
large amounts of substances which are dangerously radioactive, and will remain so for
hundreds of years. What to do with these wastes is a question as yet unanswered.
Provisional answers have been proposed, and interim management is said to be adequate,
but in the long term the question becomes one not of technology but of ethics. Should we
create these dangerous substances in ever-increasing quantities, to leave them to our
remote descendants?
Ethics aside, it has become abundantly apparent that considerations of safety affect the
overall cost of nuclear power. Just as coal-mining must take account of the cost of health
measures, land reclamation and pollution control, the use of nuclear power must allow for
costs  of extra safety measures and related provisions. The optimistic cost comparisons
originating in the early 1950s, which favoured nuclear over fossil fuels, no longer look
unarguable, as we shall describe.
Expenditure alone, however massive, seems unlikely  to provide the requisite guarantees
for one aspect which might narrowly be related to safety. As the world economy comes to
rely more and more on nuclear reactors as a source of power, so traffic in 'fissile'
materials increases  - materials which can be made into nuclear weapons. Author itative
studies have shown that provision for the security of these materials is all too often
perfunctory. The prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of unstable governments, 12
terrorist organizations or deranged fanatics is not one calculated to encourage a rosy view
of the global future. Dealing with this danger may entail special government nuclear
police forces, relentless official probing of personal histories of nuclear employees,
monolithic central administration of public policy, and other activities which come
uncomfortably close to outlin ing a virtually totalitarian social structure.
It becomes apparent, when considering these intractable problems, that the decisions we
make about nuclear energy will determine in large measure the kind of world our
grandchildren will inherit. The issues this technology has created constitute a remarkable
microcosm of the present predicament of our planet. The nuclear predicament raises a
host of social, political and even ethical problems, many of them with long-term
implications beyond any foreseeable horizon. Clearly such issues demand the fullest
public consideration, the widest possible participation in the crucial decisions to come.
Public participation in nuclear decision-making has for too long been either tentative or
desperate, largely because the issues have seemed to be cloaked in the most esoteric
scientific obscurity. But the veil of mystery surrounding nuclear matters has always been
primarily one of military secrecy, not of intellectual inaccessibility. In the next three
chapters we shall describe why and how nuclear reactors work, and the other services
they require. If you are a nuclear engineer you can skip these chapters. If not, you should
read them carefully,  as they make it easier for you to determine whether nuclear
engineers are talking sense.